War is a special business, and however general its relations may be, and
even if all the male population of a country, capable of bearing arms,
exercise this calling, still it always continues to be different and
separate from the other pursuits which occupy the life of man.--To be
imbued with a sense of the spirit and nature of this business, to make
use of, to rouse, to assimilate into the system the powers which should
be active in it, to penetrate completely into the nature of the
business with the understanding, through exercise to gain confidence and
expertness in it, to be completely given up to it, to pass out of the
man into the part which it is assigned to us to play in War, that is the
military virtue of an Army in the individual.

However much pains may be taken to combine the soldier and the citizen
in one and the same individual, whatever may be done to nationalise
Wars, and however much we may imagine times have changed since the days
of the old Condottieri, never will it be possible to do away with the
individuality of the business; and if that cannot be done, then those
who belong to it, as long as they belong to it, will always look upon
themselves as a kind of guild, in the regulations, laws and customs in
which the "Spirit of War" by preference finds its expression. And so it
is in fact. Even with the most decided inclination to look at War from
the highest point of view, it would be very wrong to look down upon this
corporate spirit (e'sprit de corps) which may and should exist more
or less in every Army. This corporate spirit forms the bond of union
between the natural forces which are active in that which we have called
military virtue. The crystals of military virtue have a greater affinity
for the spirit of a corporate body than for anything else.

An Army which preserves its usual formations under the heaviest fire,
which is never shaken by imaginary fears, and in the face of real danger
disputes the ground inch by inch, which, proud in the feeling of its
victories, never loses its sense of obedience, its respect for and
confidence in its leaders, even under the depressing effects of defeat;
an Army with all its physical powers, inured to privations and fatigue
by exercise, like the muscles of an athlete; an Army which looks upon
all its toils as the means to victory, not as a curse which hovers over
its standards, and which is always reminded of its duties and virtues by
the short catechism of one idea, namely the HONOUR OF ITS ARMS;--Such an
Army is imbued with the true military spirit.

Soldiers may fight bravely like the Vende'ans, and do great things like
the Swiss, the Americans, or Spaniards, without displaying this military
virtue. A Commander may also be successful at the head of standing
Armies, like Eugene and Marlborough, without enjoying the benefit of its
assistance; we must not, therefore, say that a successful War without
it cannot be imagined; and we draw especial attention to that point,
in order the more to individualise the conception which is here brought
forward, that the idea may not dissolve into a generalisation and that
it may not be thought that military virtue is in the end everything. It
is not so. Military virtue in an Army is a definite moral power which
may be supposed wanting, and the influence of which may therefore be
estimated--like any instrument the power of which may be calculated.

Having thus characterised it, we proceed to consider what can be
predicated of its influence, and what are the means of gaining its
assistance.

Military virtue is for the parts, what the genius of the Commander is
for the whole. The General can only guide the whole, not each separate
part, and where he cannot guide the part, there military virtue must
be its leader. A General is chosen by the reputation of his superior
talents, the chief leaders of large masses after careful probation; but
this probation diminishes as we descend the scale of rank, and in just
the same measure we may reckon less and less upon individual talents;
but what is wanting in this respect military virtue should supply. The
natural qualities of a warlike people play just this part: BRAVERY,
APTITUDE, POWERS OF ENDURANCE and ENTHUSIASM.

These properties may therefore supply the place of military virtue, and
vice versa, from which the following may be deduced:

1. Military virtue is a quality of standing Armies only, but they
require it the most. In national risings its place is supplied by
natural qualities, which develop themselves there more rapidly.

2. Standing Armies opposed to standing Armies, can more easily dispense
with it, than a standing Army opposed to a national insurrection, for in
that case, the troops are more scattered, and the divisions left more
to themselves. But where an Army can be kept concentrated, the genius of
the General takes a greater place, and supplies what is wanting in the
spirit of the Army. Therefore generally military virtue becomes more
necessary the more the theatre of operations and other circumstances
make the War complicated, and cause the forces to be scattered.

From these truths the only lesson to be derived is this, that if an Army
is deficient in this quality, every endeavour should be made to simplify
the operations of the War as much as possible, or to introduce double
efficiency in the organisation of the Army in some other respect, and
not to expect from the mere name of a standing Army, that which only the
veritable thing itself can give.

The military virtue of an Army is, therefore, one of the most important
moral powers in War, and where it is wanting, we either see its
place supplied by one of the others, such as the great superiority
of generalship or popular enthusiasm, or we find the results not
commensurate with the exertions made.--How much that is great, this
spirit, this sterling worth of an army, this refining of ore into
the polished metal, has already done, we see in the history of the
Macedonians under Alexander, the Roman legions under Cesar, the Spanish
infantry under Alexander Farnese, the Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus
and Charles XII, the Prussians under Frederick the Great, and the French
under Buonaparte. We must purposely shut our eyes against all historical
proof, if we do not admit, that the astonishing successes of these
Generals and their greatness in situations of extreme difficulty, were
only possible with Armies possessing this virtue.

This spirit can only be generated from two sources, and only by these
two conjointly; the first is a succession of campaigns and great
victories; the other is, an activity of the Army carried sometimes to
the highest pitch. Only by these, does the soldier learn to know his
powers. The more a General is in the habit of demanding from his troops,
the surer he will be that his demands will be answered. The soldier is
as proud of overcoming toil, as he is of surmounting danger. Therefore
it is only in the soil of incessant activity and exertion that the germ
will thrive, but also only in the sunshine of victory. Once it becomes a
STRONG TREE, it will stand against the fiercest storms of misfortune and
defeat, and even against the indolent inactivity of peace, at least
for a time. It can therefore only be created in War, and under great
Generals, but no doubt it may last at least for several generations,
even under Generals of moderate capacity, and through considerable
periods of peace.

With this generous and noble spirit of union in a line of veteran
troops, covered with scars and thoroughly inured to War, we must not
compare the self-esteem and vanity of a standing Army,(*) held together
merely by the glue of service-regulations and a drill book; a certain
plodding earnestness and strict discipline may keep up military virtue
for a long time, but can never create it; these things therefore have a
certain value, but must not be over-rated. Order, smartness, good will,
also a certain degree of pride and high feeling, are qualities of an
Army formed in time of peace which are to be prized, but cannot stand
alone. The whole retains the whole, and as with glass too quickly
cooled, a single crack breaks the whole mass. Above all, the highest
spirit in the world changes only too easily at the first check into
depression, and one might say into a kind of rhodomontade of alarm, the
French sauve que peut.--Such an Army can only achieve something through
its leader, never by itself. It must be led with double caution, until
by degrees, in victory and hardships, the strength grows into the full
armour. Beware then of confusing the SPIRIT of an Army with its temper.