Strategy fixes the point where, the time when, and the numerical force
with which the battle is to be fought. By this triple determination it
has therefore a very essential influence on the issue of the combat. If
tactics has fought the battle, if the result is over, let it be victory
or defeat, Strategy makes such use of it as can be made in accordance
with the great object of the War. This object is naturally often a very
distant one, seldom does it lie quite close at hand. A series of other
objects subordinate themselves to it as means. These objects, which
are at the same time means to a higher purpose, may be practically of
various kinds; even the ultimate aim of the whole War may be a different
one in every case. We shall make ourselves acquainted with these things
according as we come to know the separate objects which they come, in
contact with; and it is not our intention here to embrace the whole
subject by a complete enumeration of them, even if that were possible.
We therefore let the employment of the battle stand over for the
present.

Even those things through which Strategy has an influence on the issue
of the combat, inasmuch as it establishes the same, to a certain extent
decrees them, are not so simple that they can be embraced in one single
view. For as Strategy appoints time, place and force, it can do so in
practice in many ways, each of which influences in a different manner
the result of the combat as well as its consequences. Therefore we shall
only get acquainted with this also by degrees, that is, through the
subjects which more closely determine the application.

If we strip the combat of all modifications which it may undergo
according to its immediate purpose and the circumstances from which it
proceeds, lastly if we set aside the valour of the troops, because that
is a given quantity, then there remains only the bare conception of the
combat, that is a combat without form, in which we distinguish nothing
but the number of the combatants.

This number will therefore determine victory. Now from the number
of things above deducted to get to this point, it is shown that the
superiority in numbers in a battle is only one of the factors
employed to produce victory that therefore so far from having with the
superiority in number obtained all, or even only the principal thing, we
have perhaps got very little by it, according as the other circumstances
which co-operate happen to vary.

But this superiority has degrees, it may be imagined as twofold,
threefold or fourfold, and every one sees, that by increasing in this
way, it must (at last) overpower everything else.

In such an aspect we grant, that the superiority in numbers is the most
important factor in the result of a combat, only it must be sufficiently
great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating circumstances.
The direct result of this is, that the greatest possible number of
troops should be brought into action at the decisive point.

Whether the troops thus brought are sufficient or not, we have then done
in this respect all that our means allowed. This is the first principle
in Strategy, therefore in general as now stated, it is just as well
suited for Greeks and Persians, or for Englishmen and Mahrattas, as
for French and Germans. But we shall take a glance at our relations in
Europe, as respects War, in order to arrive at some more definite idea
on this subject.

Here we find Armies much more alike in equipment, organisation, and
practical skill of every kind. There only remains a difference in the
military virtue of Armies, and in the talent of Generals which may
fluctuate with time from side to side. If we go through the military
history of modern Europe, we find no example of a Marathon.

Frederick the Great beat 80,000 Austrians at Leuthen with about 30,000
men, and at Rosbach with 25,000 some 50,000 allies; these are however
the only instances of victories gained against an enemy double, or more
than double in numbers. Charles XII, in the battle of Narva, we cannot
well quote, for the Russians were at that time hardly to be regarded as
Europeans, also the principal circumstances, even of the battle, are
too little known. Buonaparte had at Dresden 120,000 against 220,000,
therefore not the double. At Kollin, Frederick the Great did not
succeed, with 30,000 against 50,000 Austrians, neither did Buonaparte
in the desperate battle of Leipsic, where he was 160,000 strong, against
280,000.

From this we may infer, that it is very difficult in the present state
of Europe, for the most talented General to gain a victory over an enemy
double his strength. Now if we see double numbers prove such a weight
in the scale against the greatest Generals, we may be sure, that
in ordinary cases, in small as well as great combats, an important
superiority of numbers, but which need not be over two to one, will
be sufficient to ensure the victory, however disadvantageous other
circumstances may be. Certainly, we may imagine a defile which even
tenfold would not suffice to force, but in such a case it can be no
question of a battle at all.

We think, therefore, that under our conditions, as well as in all
similar ones, the superiority at the decisive point is a matter of
capital importance, and that this subject, in the generality of cases,
is decidedly the most important of all. The strength at the decisive
point depends on the absolute strength of the Army, and on skill in
making use of it.

The first rule is therefore to enter the field with an Army as strong
as possible. This sounds very like a commonplace, but still it is really
not so.

In order to show that for a long time the strength of forces was by no
means regarded as a chief point, we need only observe, that in most,
and even in the most detailed histories of the Wars in the eighteenth
century, the strength of the Armies is either not given at all, or
only incidentally, and in no case is any special value laid upon it.
Tempelhof in his history of the Seven Years' War is the earliest writer
who gives it regularly, but at the same time he does it only very
superficially.

Even Massenbach, in his manifold critical observations on the Prussian
campaigns of 1793-94 in the Vosges, talks a great deal about hills and
valleys, roads and footpaths, but does not say a syllable about mutual
strength.

Another proof lies in a wonderful notion which haunted the heads of many
critical historians, according to which there was a certain size of an
Army which was the best, a normal strength, beyond which the forces in
excess were burdensome rather than serviceable.(*)

(*) Tempelhof and Montalembert are the first we recollect as
examples--the first in a passage of his first part, page
148; the other in his correspondence relative to the plan of
operations of the Russians in 1759.

Lastly, there are a number of instances to be found, in which all the
available forces were not really brought into the battle,(*) or into the
War, because the superiority of numbers was not considered to have that
importance which in the nature of things belongs to it.

(*) The Prussians at Jena, 1806. Wellington at Waterloo.

If we are thoroughly penetrated with the conviction that with a
considerable superiority of numbers everything possible is to be
effected, then it cannot fail that this clear conviction reacts on the
preparations for the War, so as to make us appear in the field with
as many troops as possible, and either to give us ourselves the
superiority, or at least to guard against the enemy obtaining it. So
much for what concerns the absolute force with which the War is to be
conducted.

The measure of this absolute force is determined by the Government; and
although with this determination the real action of War commences, and
it forms an essential part of the Strategy of the War, still in most
cases the General who is to command these forces in the War must regard
their absolute strength as a given quantity, whether it be that he has
had no voice in fixing it, or that circumstances prevented a sufficient
expansion being given to it.

There remains nothing, therefore, where an absolute superiority is not
attainable, but to produce a relative one at the decisive point, by
making skilful use of what we have.

The calculation of space and time appears as the most essential thing to
this end--and this has caused that subject to be regarded as one which
embraces nearly the whole art of using military forces. Indeed, some
have gone so far as to ascribe to great strategists and tacticians a
mental organ peculiarly adapted to this point.

But the calculation of time and space, although it lies universally at
the foundation of Strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread,
is still neither the most difficult, nor the most decisive one.

If we take an unprejudiced glance at military history, we shall find
that the instances in which mistakes in such a calculation have proved
the cause of serious losses are very rare, at least in Strategy. But if
the conception of a skilful combination of time and space is fully to
account for every instance of a resolute and active Commander beating
several separate opponents with one and the same army (Frederick
the Great, Buonaparte), then we perplex ourselves unnecessarily with
conventional language. For the sake of clearness and the profitable use
of conceptions, it is necessary that things should always be called by
their right names.

The right appreciation of their opponents (Daun, Schwartzenberg), the
audacity to leave for a short space of time a small force only before
them, energy in forced marches, boldness in sudden attacks, the
intensified activity which great souls acquire in the moment of danger,
these are the grounds of such victories; and what have these to do with
the ability to make an exact calculation of two such simple things as
time and space?

But even this ricochetting play of forces, "when the victories at
Rosbach and Montmirail give the impulse to victories at Leuthen and
Montereau," to which great Generals on the defensive have often trusted,
is still, if we would be clear and exact, only a rare occurrence in
history.

Much more frequently the relative superiority--that is, the skilful
assemblage of superior forces at the decisive point--has its foundation
in the right appreciation of those points, in the judicious direction
which by that means has been given to the forces from the very first,
and in the resolution required to sacrifice the unimportant to the
advantage of the important--that is, to keep the forces concentrated in
an overpowering mass. In this, Frederick the Great and Buonaparte are
particularly characteristic.

We think we have now allotted to the superiority in numbers the
importance which belongs to it; it is to be regarded as the fundamental
idea, always to be aimed at before all and as far as possible.

But to regard it on this account as a necessary condition of victory
would be a complete misconception of our exposition; in the conclusion
to be drawn from it there lies nothing more than the value which should
attach to numerical strength in the combat. If that strength is made as
great as possible, then the maxim is satisfied; a review of the total
relations must then decide whether or not the combat is to be avoided
for want of sufficient force.