As War is nothing else but a mutual process of destruction, then the
most natural answer in conception, and perhaps also in reality, appears
to be that all the powers of each party unite in one great volume and
all results in one great shock of these masses. There is certainly much
truth in this idea, and it seems to be very advisable that we should
adhere to it and should on that account look upon small combats at first
only as necessary loss, like the shavings from a carpenter's plane.
Still, however, the thing cannot be settled so easily.

That a multiplication of combats should arise from a fractioning of
forces is a matter of course, and the more immediate objects of separate
combats will therefore come before us in the subject of a fractioning
of forces; but these objects, and together with them, the whole mass of
combats may in a general way be brought under certain classes, and the
knowledge of these classes will contribute to make our observations more
intelligible.

Destruction of the enemy's military forces is in reality the object of
all combats; but other objects may be joined thereto, and these other
objects may be at the same time predominant; we must therefore draw a
distinction between those in which the destruction of the enemy's forces
is the principal object, and those in which it is more the means. The
destruction of the enemy's force, the possession of a place or the
possession of some object may be the general motive for a combat, and
it may be either one of these alone or several together, in which case
however usually one is the principal motive. Now the two principal forms
of War, the offensive and defensive, of which we shall shortly speak, do
not modify the first of these motives, but they certainly do modify
the other two, and therefore if we arrange them in a scheme they would
appear thus:--

OFFENSIVE. DEFENSIVE.
1. Destruction of enemy's force 1. Destruction of enemy's force.
2. Conquest of a place. 2. Defence of a place.
3. Conquest of some object. 3. Defence of some object.

These motives, however, do not seem to embrace completely the whole
of the subject, if we recollect that there are reconnaissances and
demonstrations, in which plainly none of these three points is the
object of the combat. In reality we must, therefore, on this account be
allowed a fourth class. Strictly speaking, in reconnaissances in which
we wish the enemy to show himself, in alarms by which we wish to wear
him out, in demonstrations by which we wish to prevent his leaving some
point or to draw him off to another, the objects are all such as can
only be attained indirectly and UNDER THE PRETEXT OF ONE OF THE THREE
OBJECTS SPECIFIED IN THE TABLE, usually of the second; for the enemy
whose aim is to reconnoitre must draw up his force as if he really
intended to attack and defeat us, or drive us off, &c. &c. But this
pretended object is not the real one, and our present question is only
as to the latter; therefore, we must to the above three objects of the
offensive further add a fourth, which is to lead the enemy to make a
false conclusion. That offensive means are conceivable in connection
with this object, lies in the nature of the thing.

On the other hand we must observe that the defence of a place may be of
two kinds, either absolute, if as a general question the point is not to
be given up, or relative if it is only required for a certain time. The
latter happens perpetually in the combats of advanced posts and rear
guards.

That the nature of these different intentions of a combat must have an
essential influence on the dispositions which are its preliminaries, is
a thing clear in itself. We act differently if our object is merely to
drive an enemy's post out of its place from what we should if our object
was to beat him completely; differently, if we mean to defend a place
to the last extremity from what we should do if our design is only
to detain the enemy for a certain time. In the first case we trouble
ourselves little about the line of retreat, in the latter it is the
principal point, &c.

But these reflections belong properly to tactics, and are only
introduced here by way of example for the sake of greater clearness.
What Strategy has to say on the different objects of the combat will
appear in the chapters which touch upon these objects. Here we have only
a few general observations to make, first, that the importance of the
object decreases nearly in the order as they stand above, therefore,
that the first of these objects must always predominate in the great
battle; lastly, that the two last in a defensive battle are in reality
such as yield no fruit, they are, that is to say, purely negative,
and can, therefore, only be serviceable, indirectly, by facilitating
something else which is positive. IT IS, THEREFORE, A BAD SIGN OF THE
STRATEGIC SITUATION IF BATTLES OF THIS KIND BECOME TOO FREQUENT.