(*) Under the then existing conditions of armament
understood. This point is of supreme importance, as
practically the whole conduct of a great battle depends on a
correct solution of this question--viz., How long can a
given command prolong its resistance? If this is incorrectly
answered in practice--the whole manoeuvre depending on it
may collapse--e.g., Kouroupatkin at Liao-Yang, September
1904.

when it may be regarded as decided, in such a way that the renewal of
the fight would be a new battle, not a continuation of the old one. To
have a clear notion on this point of time, is very important, in
order to be able to decide whether, with the prompt assistance of
reinforcements, the combat can again be resumed with advantage.

Often in combats which are beyond restoration new forces are sacrificed
in vain; often through neglect the decision has not been seized when it
might easily have been secured. Here are two examples, which could not
be more to the point:

When the Prince of Hohenlohe, in 1806, at Jena,(*) with 35,000 men
opposed to from 60,000 to 70,000, under Buonaparte, had accepted battle,
and lost it--but lost it in such a way that the 35,000 might be regarded
as dissolved--General Ruchel undertook to renew the fight with about
12,000; the consequence was that in a moment his force was scattered in
like manner.

(*) October 14, 1806.

On the other hand, on the same day at Auerstadt, the Prussians
maintained a combat with 25,000, against Davoust, who had 28,000, until
mid-day, without success, it is true, but still without the force being
reduced to a state of dissolution without even greater loss than the
enemy, who was very deficient in cavalry;--but they neglected to use the
reserve of 18,000, under General Kalkreuth, to restore the battle which,
under these circumstances, it would have been impossible to lose.

Each combat is a whole in which the partial combats combine themselves
into one total result. In this total result lies the decision of the
combat. This success need not be exactly a victory such as we have
denoted in the sixth chapter, for often the preparations for that have
not been made, often there is no opportunity if the enemy gives way too
soon, and in most cases the decision, even when the resistance has been
obstinate, takes place before such a degree of success is attained as
would completely satisfy the idea of a victory.

We therefore ask, Which is commonly the moment of the decision, that
is to say, that moment when a fresh, effective, of course not
disproportionate, force, can no longer turn a disadvantageous battle?

If we pass over false attacks, which in accordance with their nature are
properly without decision, then,

1. If the possession of a movable object was the object of the combat,
the loss of the same is always the decision.

2. If the possession of ground was the object of the combat, then the
decision generally lies in its loss. Still not always, only if this
ground is of peculiar strength, ground which is easy to pass over,
however important it may be in other respects, can be re-taken without
much danger.

3. But in all other cases, when these two circumstances have not already
decided the combat, therefore, particularly in case the destruction of
the enemy's force is the principal object, the decision is reached at
that moment when the conqueror ceases to feel himself in a state of
disintegration, that is, of unserviceableness to a certain extent, when
therefore, there is no further advantage in using the successive efforts
spoken of in the twelfth chapter of the third book. On this ground we
have given the strategic unity of the battle its place here.

A battle, therefore, in which the assailant has not lost his condition
of order and perfect efficiency at all, or, at least, only in a small
part of his force, whilst the opposing forces are, more or less,
disorganised throughout, is also not to be retrieved; and just as little
if the enemy has recovered his efficiency.

The smaller, therefore, that part of a force is which has really been
engaged, the greater that portion which as reserve has contributed to
the result only by its presence. So much the less will any new force of
the enemy wrest again the victory from our hands, and that Commander who
carries out to the furthest with his Army the principle of conducting
the combat with the greatest economy of forces, and making the most of
the moral effect of strong reserves, goes the surest way to victory.
We must allow that the French, in modern times, especially when led by
Buonaparte, have shown a thorough mastery in this.

Further, the moment when the crisis-stage of the combat ceases with
the conqueror, and his original state of order is restored, takes place
sooner the smaller the unit he controls. A picket of cavalry pursuing an
enemy at full gallop will in a few minutes resume its proper order, and
the crisis ceases. A whole regiment of cavalry requires a longer time.
It lasts still longer with infantry, if extended in single lines of
skirmishers, and longer again with Divisions of all arms, when it
happens by chance that one part has taken one direction and another part
another direction, and the combat has therefore caused a loss of the
order of formation, which usually becomes still worse from no part
knowing exactly where the other is. Thus, therefore, the point of time
when the conqueror has collected the instruments he has been using, and
which are mixed up and partly out of order, the moment when he has in
some measure rearranged them and put them in their proper places, and
thus brought the battle-workshop into a little order, this moment, we
say, is always later, the greater the total force.

Again, this moment comes later if night overtakes the conqueror in the
crisis, and, lastly, it comes later still if the country is broken and
thickly wooded. But with regard to these two points, we must observe
that night is also a great means of protection, and it is only seldom
that circumstances favour the expectation of a successful result from
a night attack, as on March 10, 1814, at Laon,(*) where York against
Marmont gives us an example completely in place here. In the same way a
wooded and broken country will afford protection against a reaction to
those who are engaged in the long crisis of victory. Both, therefore,
the night as well as the wooded and broken country are obstacles
which make the renewal of the same battle more difficult instead of
facilitating it.

(*) The celebrated charge at night upon Marmont's Corps.

Hitherto, we have considered assistance arriving for the losing side
as a mere increase of force, therefore, as a reinforcement coming up
directly from the rear, which is the most usual case. But the case is
quite different if these fresh forces come upon the enemy in flank or
rear.

On the effect of flank or rear attacks so far as they belong to
Strategy, we shall speak in another place: such a one as we have here
in view, intended for the restoration of the combat, belongs chiefly to
tactics, and is only mentioned because we are here speaking of tactical
results, our ideas, therefore, must trench upon the province of tactics.

By directing a force against the enemy's flank and rear its efficacy may
be much intensified; but this is so far from being a necessary result
always that the efficacy may, on the other hand, be just as much
weakened. The circumstances under which the combat has taken place
decide upon this part of the plan as well as upon every other, without
our being able to enter thereupon here. But, at the same time, there are
in it two things of importance for our subject: first, FLANK AND REAR
ATTACKS HAVE, AS A RULE, A MORE FAVOURABLE EFFECT ON THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE DECISION THAN UPON THE DECISION ITSELF. Now as concerns the
retrieving a battle, the first thing to be arrived at above all is a
favourable decision and not magnitude of success. In this view one would
therefore think that a force which comes to re-establish our combat
is of less assistance if it falls upon the enemy in flank and rear,
therefore separated from us, than if it joins itself to us directly;
certainly, cases are not wanting where it is so, but we must say that
the majority are on the other side, and they are so on account of the
second point which is here important to us.

This second point IS THE MORAL EFFECT OF THE SURPRISE, WHICH, AS A RULE,
A REINFORCEMENT COMING UP TO RE-ESTABLISH A COMBAT HAS GENERALLY IN ITS
FAVOUR. Now the effect of a surprise is always heightened if it takes
place in the flank or rear, and an enemy completely engaged in the
crisis of victory in his extended and scattered order, is less in a
state to counteract it. Who does not feel that an attack in flank or
rear, which at the commencement of the battle, when the forces
are concentrated and prepared for such an event would be of little
importance, gains quite another weight in the last moment of the combat.

We must, therefore, at once admit that in most cases a reinforcement
coming up on the flank or rear of the enemy will be more efficacious,
will be like the same weight at the end of a longer lever, and therefore
that under these circumstances, we may undertake to restore the battle
with the same force which employed in a direct attack would be quite
insufficient. Here results almost defy calculation, because the moral
forces gain completely the ascendency. This is therefore the right field
for boldness and daring.

The eye must, therefore, be directed on all these objects, all these
moments of co-operating forces must be taken into consideration, when we
have to decide in doubtful cases whether or not it is still possible to
restore a combat which has taken an unfavourable turn.

If the combat is to be regarded as not yet ended, then the new contest
which is opened by the arrival of assistance fuses into the former;
therefore they flow together into one common result, and the first
disadvantage vanishes completely out of the calculation. But this is not
the case if the combat was already decided; then there are two results
separate from each other. Now if the assistance which arrives is only of
a relative strength, that is, if it is not in itself alone a match for
the enemy, then a favourable result is hardly to be expected from this
second combat: but if it is so strong that it can undertake the second
combat without regard to the first, then it may be able by a favourable
issue to compensate or even overbalance the first combat, but never to
make it disappear altogether from the account.

At the battle of Kunersdorf,(*) Frederick the Great at the first onset
carried the left of the Russian position, and took seventy pieces of
artillery; at the end of the battle both were lost again, and the whole
result of the first combat was wiped out of the account. Had it been
possible to stop at the first success, and to put off the second part
of the battle to the coming day, then, even if the King had lost it, the
advantages of the first would always have been a set off to the second.

(*) August 12, 1759.

But when a battle proceeding disadvantageously is arrested and turned
before its conclusion, its minus result on our side not only disappears
from the account, but also becomes the foundation of a greater victory.
If, for instance, we picture to ourselves exactly the tactical course
of the battle, we may easily see that until it is finally concluded all
successes in partial combats are only decisions in suspense, which by
the capital decision may not only be destroyed, but changed into the
opposite. The more our forces have suffered, the more the enemy will
have expended on his side; the greater, therefore, will be the crisis
for the enemy, and the more the superiority of our fresh troops will
tell. If now the total result turns in our favour, if we wrest from the
enemy the field of battle and recover all the trophies again, then all
the forces which he has sacrificed in obtaining them become sheer gain
for us, and our former defeat becomes a stepping-stone to a greater
triumph. The most brilliant feats which with victory the enemy would
have so highly prized that the loss of forces which they cost would have
been disregarded, leave nothing now behind but regret at the sacrifice
entailed. Such is the alteration which the magic of victory and the
curse of defeat produces in the specific weight of the same elements.

Therefore, even if we are decidedly superior in strength, and are able
to repay the enemy his victory by a greater still, it is always better
to forestall the conclusion of a disadvantageous combat, if it is
of proportionate importance, so as to turn its course rather than to
deliver a second battle.

Field-Marshal Daun attempted in the year 1760 to come to the assistance
of General Laudon at Leignitz, whilst the battle lasted; but when he
failed, he did not attack the King next day, although he did not want
for means to do so.

For these reasons serious combats of advance guards which precede a
battle are to be looked upon only as necessary evils, and when not
necessary they are to be avoided.(*)

(*) This, however, was not Napoleon's view. A vigorous
attack of his advance guard he held to be necessary always,
to fix the enemy's attention and "paralyse his independent
will-power." It was the failure to make this point which, in
August 1870, led von Moltke repeatedly into the very jaws of
defeat, from which only the lethargy of Bazaine on the one
hand and the initiative of his subordinates, notably of von
Alvensleben, rescued him. This is the essence of the new
Strategic Doctrine of the French General Staff. See the
works of Bonnal, Foch, &C.--EDITOR

We have still another conclusion to examine.

If on a regular pitched battle, the decision has gone against one,
this does not constitute a motive for determining on a new one. The
determination for this new one must proceed from other relations. This
conclusion, however, is opposed by a moral force, which we must take
into account: it is the feeling of rage and revenge. From the oldest
Field-Marshal to the youngest drummer-boy this feeling is general, and,
therefore, troops are never in better spirits for fighting than when
they have to wipe out a stain. This is, however, only on the supposition
that the beaten portion is not too great in proportion to the whole,
because otherwise the above feeling is lost in that of powerlessness.

There is therefore a very natural tendency to use this moral force to
repair the disaster on the spot, and on that account chiefly to seek
another battle if other circumstances permit. It then lies in the nature
of the case that this second battle must be an offensive one.

In the catalogue of battles of second-rate importance there are many
examples to be found of such retaliatory battles; but great battles have
generally too many other determining causes to be brought on by this
weaker motive.

Such a feeling must undoubtedly have led the noble Bluecher with his
third Corps to the field of battle on February 14, 1814, when the other
two had been beaten three days before at Montmirail. Had he known
that he would have come upon Buonaparte in person, then, naturally,
preponderating reasons would have determined him to put off his revenge
to another day: but he hoped to revenge himself on Marmont, and instead
of gaining the reward of his desire for honourable satisfaction, he
suffered the penalty of his erroneous calculation.

On the duration of the combat and the moment of its decision depend the
distances from each other at which those masses should be placed which
are intended to fight IN CONJUNCTION WITH each other. This disposition
would be a tactical arrangement in so far as it relates to one and the
same battle; it can, however, only be regarded as such, provided the
position of the troops is so compact that two separate combats cannot be
imagined, and consequently that the space which the whole occupies can
be regarded strategically as a mere point. But in War, cases frequently
occur where even those forces intended to fight IN UNISON must be so far
separated from each other that while their union for one common combat
certainly remains the principal object, still the occurrence of separate
combats remains possible. Such a disposition is therefore strategic.

Dispositions of this kind are: marches in separate masses and columns,
the formation of advance guards, and flanking columns, also the grouping
of reserves intended to serve as supports for more than one strategic
point; the concentration of several Corps from widely extended
cantonments, &c. &c. We can see that the necessity for these
arrangements may constantly arise, and may consider them something like
the small change in the strategic economy, whilst the capital battles,
and all that rank with them are the gold and silver pieces.